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Abstract
The UK Supreme Court held in Montgomery v Lanarkshire HB (2015) that practitioners must take reasonable care to
ensure patients are aware of any material risks involved in treatment. We reviewed all court decisions since Montgomery
which deal with the case, to establish how this judgment is being interpreted by the courts and the implications of this
for risk disclosure in practice. We found that Montgomery’s application has been expanded in a number of ways:
information about reasonable alternatives includes the provision of information about their risks and benefits;
Montgomery applies to post- as well as pre-operative disclosure; and the timing of discussion with patients about
risks is important. Conversely, there is evidence that the parameters of Montgomery are being curtailed, giving rise to
questions about judicial commitment to patient autonomy. In some cases there is focus on the objective risks
of procedures as opposed to patients’ subjective concerns; in others, causation of injury is sometimes a factor that
will defeat claims. There are also further questions about whether patients now should accept more responsibility for
the outcome of decisions they make. We conclude that practitioners engaged in discussions about the risks of proposed
treatments and their alternatives have been left in a position of uncertainty by the courts in relation to the obtaining of
informed consent in practice. It is now critical that updated guidance is provided by the UK General Medical Council to
give practitioners and service providers confidence that they are adhering to the law.
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Introduction
The landmark judgment of the UK Supreme Court in
Montgomery v Lanarkshirea held that a doctor must
take reasonable care to ensure that a patient is aware
of any material risks involved in any recommended
treatment and of any reasonable alternative or variant
treatments. The test of materiality was defined as
whether ‘a reasonable person in the patient’s position
would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the
doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the par-
ticular patient would be likely to attach significance to
it’.b This test has been the subject of an evolving body
of analysis,1,2 some from an international perspective,3
which considers its wider implications for the provision
of modern healthcare.4,5 Broadly speaking, the provi-
sions of the case, which support patient autonomy,
have been welcomed. This article, however, argues
that despite the apparent clarity that the case brings
to the question of risk disclosure, practitioners are
left with insufficient certainty as to how they should
help patients to realise their autonomy in practice.
This piece presents the findings of a project which
considers the implications of Montgomery for practi-
tioners and patients in the practical process of obtain-
ing informed consent. To address this, we analysed
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how Montgomery has been interpreted and applied by
the courts in subsequent clinical negligence cases.
Our findings demonstrate that, while the courts have
provided some clarity on the application of
Montgomery, there are a number of areas in which
practitioners are left without firm guidance from
either courts or regulators regarding the extent of
their duty in practice. We therefore make a call for
professional regulators to provide detailed, up-to-date
guidance for the benefit of patients and practitioners.
Extending the boundaries of Montgomery
The extent of Montgomery’s reach has been expanded
in three distinct ways. First, while the principal focus of
the judgment was on pre-operative risk disclosure,
Montgomery has been interpreted to extend beyond a
focus on the risks of the proposed form of treatment.
To this end, greater emphasis has been placed on the
need to discuss reasonable alternative treatments with
patients. Similarly, in order to contextualise any
associated risks, patients must also be informed of
the benefits of a proposed course of action.c This
should not be confined solely to a particular treatment
option favoured by the consultant, but ought to include
information about the benefit versus risk ratio of the
range of treatments that may be available. Yet what is
meant by ‘reasonable’ alternatives is far from clear, and
so far only sparse guidance has been provided by the
courts.d It would go beyond the concept of reasonable-
ness in negligence if the duty created an expectation
that every conceivable alternative treatment must be
discussed in detail with patients, so further elaboration
is needed to ascertain how close ‘reasonable’ alternative
treatments have to be to one another to require disclo-
sure. If, as has been suggested,e Montgomery places a
duty on doctors to disclose the ‘uncertainties’ associat-
ed with a range of medical treatments, then the precise
scope of the legal duty arguably remains poorly
defined, leaving practitioners vulnerable to legal chal-
lenge depending on which approach they adopt.
It would seem that the Montgomery duty has also
spread to post-operative disclosure. Recently, for exam-
ple, liability was imposed where a patient developed
bilateral pulmonary emboli after a double hernia
repair.f He was not provided with information about
this post-operative risk and was therefore not alerted to
its warning signs. Broadening the duty to situations
such as this raises a number of questions. First, what
causes a post-operative risk to be classified as ‘signifi-
cant’? Lords Kerr and Reed stated that assessment of
the significance of a risk does not relate merely to its
statistical likelihood but is also ‘fact-sensitive’, incor-
porating consideration of the nature of the risk, its
potential effects on the patient, the importance to the
patient of the potential benefits of the proposed treat-
ment and available alternative approaches.g How then,
if at all, does a post-operative risk differ in nature to a
pre-operative risk? Logic suggests that if a judge deter-
mined a risk to be significant post-operatively, then it
should have been categorised as such pre-operatively
for the purposes of obtaining informed consent. This
was held not to be the case and so one is left wondering
what it may take to transform the nature of any risk
into being significant only after the operation. Such a
requirement may place considerable strain on the
resources available for hospital discharge processes.
Finally, it is apparent thatMontgomery has a variety
of implications for the timing of discussions about
treatment. It has been held that there can be a duty
to inform the patient if there is a last-minute change
of surgeon.h The indication now is that if a patient
initially consents to a medical procedure under the
care of a particular named consultant and that surgeon
does not perform the operation due to a change in
personnel, the patient must be informed of this switch
in a timely manner. Failure to do so may result in the
patient being able to recover damages should any sub-
sequent harm occur. Such a change in personnel may
have profound practical implications for whether the
procedure can take place as planned. This is because
the courts have also stressed that it is not appropriate
for patients to have to make decisions immediately
prior to surgery because ‘[t]here is no ‘adequate time
and space’ for a sensible dialogue to occur and for
free choice to be exercised’.i This attitude reflects the
idea that patients are now recognised as consumers,
a central tenet of Montgomery,j but may mean that a
delay is required to give such consumers the time and
space needed to reflect on their choices. It has also been
held that the post-operative information which may
need to be given to patients should not be delayed with-
out good reason, and that it should be imparted as
soon as the patient is well enough to participate in
the discussion.k
This interpretation of Montgomery illustrates its
capacity for expansion into unconsidered areas of dis-
cussion about risk with patients and highlights the need
on the part of regulators for carefully considered
updates to the guidance they provide.
Clipping Montgomery’s wings
While the open-ended aspects of the judgment in
Montgomery have allowed judges to adopt an expan-
sive and claimant-friendly attitude to the ruling, there
is evidence to suggest that the converse is also occur-
ring. We have identified three examples of control
mechanisms used by the courts that have potential to
limit its significance.
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The first key issue centres on how judges conceptu-
alise risk. From whose perspective should the signifi-
cance of risk be determined? Montgomery asserts that
this should be assessed through the lens of patients, and
thus demands a hybrid objective–subjective approach,
focusing not only on what the reasonable patient may
find significant in the circumstances, but also on what
the particular patient may find significant. The inclu-
sion of the subjective limb in the new disclosure test
provides an added sting in the tail in its capacity to turn
what most reasonable patients may class as an insignif-
icant risk, into a subjectively defined material one.
Despite this being capable of benefitting claimants,
there are signs that some judges remain preoccupied
with the objective element of the test – to the exclusion
of the subjective component – which the Supreme
Court stated was an integral aspect of the assessment
of the significance of risk.l This can be seen in the reli-
ance on medical evidence pertaining to percentage rates
of occurrence that has been a feature of some of the
post-Montgomery case law; undermining the ability of
patients to bring their own experience, interests and
preferences to the process of shared decision-making.
For example, in one case a risk of 1 in 1000 was held to
be a theoretical and background risk and therefore not
significant.m Viewed objectively most would not dis-
agree with that assessment, but this line of reasoning
overlooked how the nature of this risk (of an unborn
baby suffering from chromosomal abnormality causing
severe disabilities) would have operated on the mind of
that particular patient, both in terms of the severity of
consequence should it have materialised and how she
would have responded had she been informed of it.
While it remains right to take objective risk into
account, this cannot be done in isolation. Excessive
deference to statistics to resolve the issue of significance
effectively permits the medical profession to dictate, or
at least heavily influence, the legal standard of disclo-
sure, which was the very position from which
Montgomery intended to retreat.
A further limiting factor is the legal obstacle of cau-
sation, which asks, hypothetically: What would the
patient have done had she been informed about the
risk? If it is concluded, on balance, that the patient
would have proceeded with the operation anyway,
her claim must fail. The courts have in the past been
willing to relax causation principles in order to protect
patients who can show that, had they been properly
informed, they would have delayed the procedure
even if they cannot prove they would have refused it
altogether.n Yet, post-Montgomery, the Court of
Appeal has refused to extend this any further,o and a
more conservative attitude prevails. This is particularly
evident where the doctor has failed to inform the
patient of a reasonable alternative: the patient bears
the burden of proving they would have chosen the
alternative and the court must be satisfied that the
patient is not swayed by hindsight. In Diamond,p for
example, there was a breach of the duty to disclose
information for a mesh repair. Whilst the claimant gen-
uinely believed she would have chosen differently had
she had the information, she failed to demonstrate that
she would actually have done so. In Australia, the cau-
sation test has been used as a ‘control mechanism’ to
limit the numbers of successful informed consent
claims.6 The lower courts in England and Wales do
not yet appear to have followed this example to the
same extent.q Indeed, some scholars doubt that they
ever will due to the Supreme Court’s clear commitment
to the principle of patient autonomy.r This would be
sensible, for caution is needed in using causation as a
type of control device; it runs the risk of undermining
all that Montgomery purports to bring in terms of a
more sympathetic standard of disclosure. Yet, it is
beyond question that since Montgomery, English
courts have still become less generous to patients in
the approach they have adopted to causation.
A final question is: What responsibility, if any,
should patients have regarding decisions they may
make against medical advice? A key message from
Montgomery is that it is no longer appropriate to
view patients as ‘passive recipients’ of medical care,
but to recognise that they should be actively involved
in their healthcare choices.s To this end, it has been
convincingly argued that patients also have obliga-
tions.7 As the body of post-Montgomery case law devel-
ops, it is possible that judges may remain more
cognisant of this when assessing the question of fault.
Where, for example, a patient is provided with detailed
and relevant information and agrees to follow a desig-
nated care plan, what happens where the patient then
ignores that care plan and agrees to undertake a risky
operation earlier than advised? This point recently
arose in a case where a patient who had been advised
to manage his spinal compression conservatively
through physiotherapy was then put on the waiting
list for surgery due to an administrative error on the
part of the hospital trust.t On raising the discrepancy,
the patient was told that if he did not agree to go ahead
with the surgery he would be put to the bottom of the
list, so he decided to proceed. As a result of the non-
negligent surgery, the claimant suffered nerve root
injury. Where any scope for harm is exacerbated by
the early performance of that medical procedure,
then, irrespective of whether there has been a failure
to disclose certain risks, it would not be wholly unrea-
sonable for a judge to conclude that the patient con-
tributed to her own harm and to adjust the level of
damages accordingly. In this case, while the patient
was held not to be contributorily negligent for failing
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to follow the conservative management plan, it is cer-
tainly possible that in future assessing patients’ conduct
in the consent process could be a further way of miti-
gating against the harsher effects of Montgomery.
Implications for the consent process
The above developing legal trends give rise to a further
practical dimension to consider: What will the effect of
Montgomery be on the logistics of hospital consent pro-
cesses and the resources needed to fulfil obligations? In
particular, what role is the consent form going to play
in the aftermath of Montgomery? A worrying conse-
quence of the judgment could be that consent forms
are now made more intricate and detailed, and that
practitioners will spend more time listing every possible
risk and alternative on the form in order to safeguard
themselves against the threat of litigation. This poses
the danger of detracting from consent being viewed as a
shared decision-making process, in which the patient
should be encouraged to participate. The net effect of
Montgomery should not be to promote the rigorous
filling in of a more elaborate consent form, but to
encourage a dialogue between doctor and patient in
order to help the latter develop a greater understanding
of the nature of their illness and of the various options
that are available to treat it. This may mean that con-
sent procedures take more time than has historically
been the case.
It is acknowledged that time is a precious commod-
ity in the modern NHS. However, the implications of
Montgomery, and its subsequent interpretation, are
that practitioners are expected to invest the time
required both to provide information about risks and
benefits and to obtain information from the patient
which will enable them to do so in a meaningful
way.u It is hoped that this will confer a number of
benefits in the long run, not only as it may reduce the
likelihood of doctors becoming the subject of a lawsuit,
but also because it may facilitate improved communi-
cation between doctors and patients, encouraging levels
of patient engagement which are recognised as contrib-
uting to their good health.8 Any additional time and
resource should not be channelled into ticking extra
boxes and listing more risks, but to having an open
and transparent discussion with the patient to maxi-
mise their understanding and ownership of
the decision.v
Conclusions
We can reasonably expect the situations in which
patient choice is protected to develop incrementally,
but the courts are clear that failure to warn of risks
does not give rise to a free-standing claim in damages.w
We have outlined developing control mechanisms that
limit any potential rise in claims, but overzealous appli-
cation would risk undermining advantages gained from
the alignment of the law with principles of shared
decision-making long espoused in practice. Yet the
courts’ application of Montgomery has served to ask
as many questions as it has answered. This has pro-
found implications for those practitioners engaged in
discussions about the risks and benefits of proposed
treatment and may require significant changes to the
processes and procedures currently in place to obtain
and document patient consent. This is also of particu-
lar significance to the General Medical Council
(GMC), who will have to make sense of these complex
issues when crafting the new version of their ethical
guidance on consent.9
Key messages
1. Montgomery establishes duties to disclose risks, ben-
efits and reasonable alternatives but its subsequent
interpretation by the courts leaves practitioners with
uncertainty about how to fulfil these duties
in practice.
2. The uncertainty surrounding what constitutes ‘rea-
sonable alternatives’ and when post-operative risks
should be disclosed pose challenges for clini-
cal practice.
3. Montgomery’s pro-patient choice ethos might be
restricted by the courts’ reliance on statistical evi-
dence and by the law of causation and contributory
negligence.
4. Montgomery’s emphasis on the importance of
dialogue and good record-keeping requires the
adaptation of clinical practice, rather than wholesale
change.
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